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JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE
DAVID B. WEXLER1

Mental health law advocates and even scholars have typically been hostile
toward, afraid of, or at best indifferent to, the mental health disciplines (mainly
psychiatry and psychology) and their practitioners. The reason for this is that
modem mental health law, as part of the civil liberties revolution, was
conceived to correct the abusive exercise of state psychiatric power.2 As such,
it took its place as part of the anti-psychiatry movement.
Learning to be skeptical of supposed scientific expertise is an important
lesson, and the law should never simply defer to psychiatry and the related
disciplines. 3 But to the extent that the legal system (and even legal academics)
now ignore developments in the mental health disciplines, the lesson of healthy
skepticism has been overleamed. It is my thesis, then, that those of us interested
in 'justice" in mental health law ought not to adopt the shortsighted and
anti-intellectual stance of ignoring or shunning the mental health disciplines.
Indeed, as I hope to show in this essay, an appreciation of the mental health
disciplines can in many instances help to create a more just legal system and
should surely contribute meaningfully and refreshingly to the dialogue on
rights and justice.
The vehicle for bringing mental health insights into the study of law is
therapeutic jurisprudence-the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic

1 J.D.,

1964, New York University. John D. Lyons Professor of Law and
Professor of Psychology, University of Arizona. The author, a former student
of Robert McKay, served, together with Dean Steven R. Smith, as a co-leader
of a Conference Workshop dealing with justice issues in law and mental health.
2See BRUCE J.ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972). Often, however, the
judiciary encouraged the exercise--and misuse--of psychiatric power,
sometimes through discouraging effective advocacy by attorneys. Norman G.
Poythress Jr., PsychiatricExpertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to
Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 16 (1978); Michael L.
Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental
DisabilityCases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.39, 44-45 n.33 (1992) [hereinafter Fatal
Assumption] (referring to personal advocacy experience and the advocacy
experience of colleague, Professor Keri Gould).
3 For current
examples of inappropriate deference-even abdication--by
the appellate judiciary, see Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts":
From Deference to Abdication Under the ProfessionalJudgment Standard, 102 YALE
L.J. 639 (1992).
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agent.4 Therapeutic jurisprudence is a truly interdisciplinary enterprise that
proposes that we explore ways in which, consistent with principles of justice,
the knowledge, theories, and insights of the mental health and related
disciplines can help shape the development of the law.
Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that the law itself can be seen to function
as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent. Legal rules, legal procedures, and
the roles of legal actors (such as lawyers and judges) constitute social forces
that, like it or not, often produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences.
Therapeutic jurisprudence proposes that we be sensitive to those
consequences, rather than ignore them, and that we ask the question whether
the law's anthitherapeutic consequences can be reduced, and its therapeutic
consequences enhanced, without subordinating due process and justice
values.5 Therapeutic jurisprudence in no way suggests that therapeutic
considerations should trump other considerations. Therapeutic considerations
are but one category of important considerations, as are autonomy, integrity of
the fact-finding process, community safety, and many more. Therapeutic
jurisprudence does not itself purport to resolve the value questions; instead, it
6
sets the stage for their sharp articulation.
Often, legal arrangements or legal doctrines can be established that promote
therapeutic outcomes while, at the same time, advancing (or leaving
unaffected) liberty or justice interests. As Professor Schopp has noted, "early
work in the agenda of therapeutic jurisprudence has tended to seek this
convergence... -7
Some of my own writings seem illustrative of the desire to seek convergence
between therapeutic and justice interests. One piece, for example, shows how
psychological principles for increasing patient compliance with medical advice
can be imported into the legal system and used by judges to increase an insanity

4 See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1991) [hereinafter ESSAYs]; DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC

JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990) [hereinafter
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE]; David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand
Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEH. SCi. & L. 17 (1993)(discussing

recent therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship).
5

MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL & CRIMINAL § 1.05a
(Supp. 1992).
6
Therapeutic jurisprudence will also often force the mental health
disciplines to demonstrate the efficacy of their procedures. John W. Parry,
PsychiatricTreatment and Justiceat Odds, 15 MENT. & PHYS. DISAB. L. REP. 119,
120 (1991)(book reviews).
7 Robert

F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Conflicts Among Values in
Mental Health Law, 11 BEH. SCI. & L. 31 (1993).
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acquittee's (or a probationer's) compliance with conditions of release (e.g.,
taking medication, keeping appointments, etc.). 8
The psychological principles suggest that when one signs a behavioral
contract, one is more likely to comply than if one does not embody the
agreement in a behavioral contract. Also, one who makes a "public"
commitment to comply-a commitment to persons above and beyond the
medical provider-is more likely to comply than is one who makes no such
public commitment. Relatedly, if family members are involved and aware of a
patient's agreement, the patient is more likely to comply with the conditions
than if family members are uninvolved in the process.
Therapeutic jurisprudence would suggest that trial judges shaping
conditional release orders might increase compliance with such orders if a
patient/defendant were asked to embody the conditional release plan in a
behavioral contract, and if the hearing were used as a forum for the
patient/defendant to make a "public" commitment to comply-a comuitment
made in the presence of the judge and agreed-upon family members. Such a
procedure would tap therapeutic potential without offending our notions of
justice.
Another "convergence" piece draws on the clinical insight that
offenders-and particularly sex offenders-harbor "cognitive distortions"
about their offending behavior and therefore tend to deny or minimize their
involvement in criminal activity.9 As a first step in therapy, mental health
practitioners seek to perform a task of "cognitive restructuring"--an attempt to
break through offender denial by having the offender admit to the underlying
conduct and its details.
Therapeutic jurisprudence might ask whether the law operates
antitherapeutically, by promoting cognitive distortion, or whether it operates
therapeutically, by setting the stage for cognitive restructuring. Since most
offenders plead guilty, the plea process might be a profitable stage to examine
for therapeutic jurisprudence implications. For example, when a trial judge
accepts a guilty plea and goes through the process of establishing a factual basis
for that plea, the behavior of the judge may be looked at in therapeutic
jurisprudence terms. If the judge involves the defendant only minimally, and
looks to the record and to statements by the prosecutor and defense counsel to
establish the factual basis of the plea, a defendant harboring cognitive
distortions might not have those distortions confronted head-on by the plea
process and the colloquy with the judge. On the other hand, if the judge

8David B. Wexler, Health CareCompliancePrinciplesand the InsanityAcquittee
ConditionalRelease Process, in ESSAYS, supra note 4, at 199.
9

David B. Wexler and Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 Mental & Phys. Disab. L. Rep. 225,
229-30 (1992). Seealso Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive RestructuringThrough Law:
A TherapeuticJurisprudenceApproach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 579,581-82 (1992).
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conducts a change of plea hearing so as to involve the defendant personally
and heavily in the process of ascertaining a factual basis for the plea, the court
may actually be performing a therapeutically valuable cognitive restructuring
function.
In terms of our search for convergence of therapeutic and justice goals, it is
interesting to note the research of legal anthropologist Susan Philips, who
observed and analyzed a number of plea hearingsl 0 Philips concluded that
civil libertarian judges were "procedure oriented" and involved the defendant
heavily in the process of establishing a factual basis for the plea. It was the
politically conservative judges who were "record oriented" and who tended to
establish the factual basis with minimal involvement of the defendant. Those
judges regarded the defendant as someone who might mess up and muddy an
otherwise clean change of plea record, perhaps rendering the plea more
vulnerable to collateral or appellate attack.
Although the early work in therapeutic jurisprudence has indeed tended to
seek out areas where there is a convergence between therapeutic and justice
interests, such convergence is by no means inevitable. When there is a potential
conflict, therapeutic jurisprudence does not itself attempt to resolve the debate.
Therapeutic jurisprudence performs a service, however, by bringing the debate
to the fore.
Professor Schopp, for example, has advanced the discussion of rights and
justice by noting that a conflict between therapeutic interests and individual
liberty might be resolved through a "constraint" approach or through a
'"balancing" approach:
When therapeutic interests conflict with individual liberty, one can
advocate either of two plausible relationships between the competing
values. First, one can grant a priority to one value over the other such
that the first serves as a constraint on the second. According to this
approach, for example, liberty might constrain therapeutic efforts such
that any therapeutic program must give way when it conflicts with
protective liberty, regardless of the magnitude of the potential gains or
losses to each value. Alternately, one can balance the two competing
values, selecting a rule or deciding a case by weighing the relative gains
and losses to each value in the circumstances.
Apart from the "constraint" and "balancing" inquiry, any potential conflict is
likely to require us to think more clearly than we currently do about exactly
what we mean by particular rights. A potential conflict will force us to focus
on what the right entails, what its purpose is, and how it is likely to work in
the real world.

1

°Susan U. Philips, Ideological Diversity in Courtroom Discourse:Due Process
Judicial Discretion and the Guilty Plea (tentative title of book manuscript in
preparation)(on file with author).
11

Schopp, supranote 7, at 32.
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Let me provide a concrete example that arose in my teaching. In my
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Seminar, students are required to submit a short
(e.g., 2-3 page) weekly reaction paper on the assigned readings. The reaction
papers typically form the basis of classroom discussion. 12 One week, the topic
for discussion was the therapeutic or antitherapeutic aspects of the legal
process, with particular attention paid to the civil commitment hearing. The
reading assignment included four chapters from one of the assigned texts, 13 as
well as a recent law review article.14 Some of the pieces emphasize the potential
harm that could occur by having an emotionally troubled person (particularly
an adolescent) listen to adverse testimony at a civil commitment hearing. Other
readings addressed the importance of such hearings for communicating to the
person exactly what it is about his or her behavior that society finds troubling
and unacceptable. An assigned article by Tom Tyler suggested that according
a patient respect and giving him or her "voice" in the proceeding would likely
lead to greater acceptability15of even an adverse judgment and would lead to
greater therapeutic efficacy.
Against the background of those readings, Marc Natelsky, one of the seminar
students, proposed a "model" that he thought would increase the factual
integrity of the process, clarify the roles of the participants, give the respondent
"voice", and, at the same time, operate without some of the antitherapeutic
aspects of the hearing that are worrisome to some commentators. Here is a
somewhat abbreviated version of his reaction paper, which seems to propose
a model that bears some similarity to the Continental system of criminal
adjudication:
This week's assignments in TJ discuss at length the possible
therapeutic benefits that may be realized through a retooling of the
civil commitment hearing. The greatest difficulty... appears to be that
of assigning proper... roles for the judge and attorneys.

12 For more on the teaching of therapeutic jurisprudence, see ESSAYS, supra
note 4, 292-301.
13
The assignment included one case, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), as
well as John J. Ensminger & Thomas D. Liguori, The TherapeuticSignificance of
the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, in THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 245; Marc Amaya & W.V. Burlingame, Judicial
Review of Psychiatric Admissions: The Clinical Impact on Child and Adolescent
Inpatients, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 281; Michael L.
Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to ChiefJustice Warren
Burger's "Time-Consuming ProceduralMinuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., in
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 293.
14 Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implicationsfor Civil Commitment Hearings,46 SMU L. REV. 433 (1992).
15 Id. at 439-40.
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The traditional respective roles of judge as impartial arbiter and of
defense attorney as dogged advocate are problematic, because both
roles must be essentially compromised in order for the patient to secure
the care he may need. The judge must interact closely with
professionals, to whom he often defers.., due to a lack of knowledge
of the field. The defense attorney is often placed in the uncomfortable
position of denying hospitalization to someone who truly needs
inpatient care, and might harm self or others if released, due to the
attorney's efforts .... The defense attorney might be violating the duty
of loyalty in a majority of cases, as he is no longer playing the
traditional role of ardent defender.
Because the role of judge and defense counsel have become so
compromised in civil commitment hearings, I propose an alternative
that might replace both traditional roles, while still meeting
constitutional due process mandates. Because the judge and defense
attorney are no longer, respectively, impartial and zealous, I believe
that the roles of judge and defense attorney can be combined into a
role;... the fact-finder represents the interests of no party,
fact-finder ...
responsible only for deciding whether a given hospitalization is
necessary based on open testimony and records. The fact-finder must
hear all witnesses, gather all pertinent evidence, and interview the
family, if necessary. The patient.., must be given a forum to present
his views... This [procedure] would be available to minors and adults.
Precisely because due process is so vital, I believe that this type of
[procedure] is necessary. Under the current system, prosecutors are
often ignorant of the nature of their cases until the morning of the trial.
Judges are easily swayed by professionals, and patients are rarely
given a forum. Defense attorneys are necessarily compromised by the
gravity of the situation, and the incongruity of a "vigorous defense"
when release may, in a given case, be the very worst thing for the
patient. Under a fact-finder system, the judge would assume a role
. . . responsible for gathering the facts of the case. The "civil
commitment arbitrator" would be much more effective than players in
the current system, in that he would be held to a high standard of
having extensive knowledge in the field ... and would be responsible
for maintaining a reasonable knowledge of mental health law and
issues. This knowledge is sorely lacking presently, with neither judge,
defender, nor prosecutor possessing enough knowledge to really be
effective ....
Natelsky's "model"-which should obviously be regarded as food for
thought rather than as a fully developed proposal-raises some very
interesting questions, as indeed it did in the seminar session in which it was
discussed. First of all, the proposed procedure is recommended both for the
commitment of minors and for the commitment of adults. In the context of
minors, if the procedure is invoked in situations where the parents are seeking
commitment and where the hospital is willing to accept the juvenile, the
proposal seems plainly constitutional. After all, in that setting, the suggested
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol40/iss3/30
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safeguards far exceed the minimal due process protections accorded juveniles
by the Supreme Court decision in Parham v. 1.R.16
Indeed, since the proposal clearly exceeds constitutional requirements, a
state would be free to institute these procedures, and researchers and
policymakers might then be able to assess the relative therapeutic and other
merits of the proposal in comparison with the "ordinary" Parhamprotections
generally in operation. For example, will juveniles given "voice" under the
proposal more readily accept an order of commitment, cooperate more fully
with treatment teams, and have a more favorable therapeutic outcome than
those accorded the barebones Parham protections?
In the adult commitment context, the proposal clearly conflicts with our
traditional notions of the right to an adversary hearing and the right to counsel.
But the proposal forces us to think through the ways in which the proposal
differs from our traditional rights and what it is about those rights that we hold
dear.
Under Natelsky's scheme, some important fact-gathering by the
investigative/judicial official will apparently take place outside the presence
of respondent. Such a proposal therefore raises questions about a cluster of
rights, 17 including the right, in theory and practice, to face-to-face
confrontation.
Does or should the right to face-to-face confrontation apply to a civil
commitment hearing as well as to a criminal hearing? How important is
face-to-face confrontation in a jurisdiction where respondent's presence at the
hearing can be waived "by such person or by adversary counsel acting in her
behalf and for good cause shown?" 18 How important is the right in jurisdictions
where counsel routinely waives respondent's presence or where patients
overwhelmingly choose not to attend? 19 How important is the right in
jurisdictions where the respondent is required to appear at the hearing but
where live medical testimony will not be offered unless the respondent, before
the hearing, notifies the court that he or she wishes to cross-examine the

16442 U.S. 584 (1979).
171f civil commitment is analogized to a criminal proceeding, these rights
would include the right to notice, to a public trial, to the presence of respondent,
to cross-examination and the exclusion of hearsay, to compulsory process, and
to effective counsel. RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 716-23 (2d ed. 1990).
18

Greene v. State, 537 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).

19

See Fred Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 428-29 (1966). The author visited the Austin
Mentally Ill,
State Hospital, Austin, Texas, to observe commitment hearings. Of forty
hearings observed in one day, only 2 were attended by the patient/respondent.
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examining physician? 20 Is the purpose of face-to-face confrontation tied
exclusively to promoting the integrity of the fact-finding process? If so, is the
Natelsky proposal likely to yield at least as accurate a factual picture as would
a traditional civil commitment hearing? Are there some other values protected
by face-to-face confrontation? Are there ways of modifying the proposal to
accommodate those values?
How should procedural law reform proposals be constitutionally assessed,
given the massive difference between the theory and reality of adversary
commitment hearings? Those familiar with hearings21 know that the Supreme
Court unfortunately understated the situation when it noted that "the
supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the
appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of
mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real."22 When
traditional "adversary" hearings typically take only a matter of minutes, 23 can
we really say the traditional due process right is meaningful? Which
proceeding would the typical respondent find fairer? A currently conducted
hearing or the procedure proposed by Natelsky? Putting aside for the moment
the question of counsel, if a state were genuinely interested in implementing
the Natelsky adjudicative model, should we mechanically condemn the
procedure as unconstitutional and insist upon continuing the sham that may
well now exist in that state?
And with respect to counsel, is the absence of counsel really worse than
counsel who performs in a wholly perfunctory-or even
compromised-fashion? 24 Again, which system would a respondent find
fairer? If some sort of ally/mouthpiece is necessary, must it take the form of
counsel? Why not a lay advocate from a Protection and Advocacy agency?
Which of the two (agency lay advocate or appointed attorney) would likely
20

See David B. Wexler, The Waivability of Recommitment Hearings,20 ARIZ. L.
REv. 175,181 n.31 (1978) (citingCoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-178(c) (West Supp.
1978).
21
See, e.g., Fatal Assumption, supra note 2; David B. Wexler & Stanley E.
Scoville, The Administration of PsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practicein Arizona,
13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1971); Cohen, supra note 19.
22 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979). For a recent study indicating that
the supposed protections for an adversary proceeding remain more illusory
than real, see Jane Hudson, ProgressMade in Representationin Civil Commitment
Hearings, 19 Centerline 2 (Winter 1993) (reporting on a recent study by the
Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest that focuses on representation in
Maricopa County, Arizona).
23

Parham,442 U.S. at 609 n.17.
See generally Fatal Assumption, supra note 2. See also Michael L. Perlin,
Pretexts and Mental DisabilityLaw: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
(forthcoming 1993) (antitherapeutic aspects flowing from the pretext of a
system claiming to provide vigorous counsel).
24
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know more? Be better motivated to help the client? Be more willing to act as a
true advocate? Perform better?
My overall point, then, is that by attending carefully to the therapeutic or
antitherapeutic implications that often inescapably flow from various rules of
law, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors, we will in no way disserve
justice. Instead, we may find creative ways of crafting legal arrangements
whereby we can preserve justice and increase therapeutic benefit. In cases
where convergence is not possible, therapeutic jurisprudence does not call for
elevating therapeutic values. Sometimes, other values will surely prevail even
if the results are antitherapeutic. The constitutional rule prohibiting the
execution of the mentally incompetent is a clear example.25 In many instances,
we may conclude that therapeutic concerns should be operative only within
certain limits which are themselves fixed by concepts of justice. A criminal law
analogy would be sentencing schemes that allow sentencing for utilitarian
purposes, but only within a time frame fixed by notions of just deserts. 26 In still
other cases of potential conflict, we will need to precisely define the conflict,
and that ought to shed new light on the rights and justice concerns at issue.
In terms of rethinking the purpose and application of constitutional rights,
Professor Slobogin's recent exercise of casting aside the shackles of caselaw and
probing more deeply the fundamental values served by the Fourth
Amendment 27 can serve as a model for more meaningful justice discussions in
the law and mental health field. Instead of being prompted to think about rights
because of the influence of another discipline (e.g., psychology or psychiatry),
Slobogin's contribution was apparently aided by a comparative law
perspective (faculty workshops on search and seizure that Slobogin conducted
in Australia). Here is how Slobogin viewed his task:
How would we regulate searches and seizures if the Fourth
Amendment did not exist?... Starting on a blank slate, as it were,

should free us from current preconceptions about the law of search and
seizure, ingrained after years of analyzing current dogma. Viewed
from this fresh perspective we might gain a better understanding of
the values at stake when the state seeks to obtain evidence or detain
suspects. This new understanding in turn should invigorate criticism
25

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
A normative principle-the notion that it does not comport with human
dignity to execute a defendant who is so mentally ill that he is unable to
understand and appreciate why he is being put to death-drives the
Fordanalysis, and in our view this normative principle justifies the Court's
decision in Ford even if it is shown to be antitherapeutic in effect [by
encouraging and rewarding incompetence].
ESSAYS, supra note 4, at 313 n.23.
26

NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).

27

Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1 (1991).
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of current law, and might even lead to28fundamental reinterpretations
of the Fourth Amendment's language.
Slobogin's refreshing approach is reminiscent of the Warren Court's
invitation, apparently never accepted by policymakers or scholars, to think
through the true bases of Miranda29 and the line-up cases. 30 Recall that the
Miranda Court required specific warnings and waivers, including advice
regarding appointed counsel during interrogation, "unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons to their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it .... "31 With lineups, the Court's
32
right to counsel was not intended as a "constitutional straightjacket":
"Legislative or other regulations... which eliminate the risks of abuse and
unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to
meaningful confrontation at trial may ... remove the basis for regarding the
stage as 'critical'. 33
In my experience, this sort of analysis in the mental health law context is
often sparked by attempts, such as the above-noted seminar paper, seeking
simultaneously to explore justice and therapeutic concerns. In many contexts,
surely including traditional mental health law, "rights" talk has become stale.34
Just as a comparative law perspective may rejuvenate the study of rights in
constitutional criminal procedure, perhaps the therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective will revivify rights talk in mental health law-and in our teaching
and scholarship.

28

Id. at 3-4.

29 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30

See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

31384 U.S. at 444. See also id. at 467.
32388 U.S. at 239.
33

Id.

34 Ingo Keilitz, Justiceand Mental Health Systems Interactions,16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 1, 2 (1992); Daniel W. Shuman, Overview, 46 SMU L. REv. 323,324 (1992)
(introduction to mental disability law symposium).
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